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THE LAW OF STRIKES AND PICKETING
IN CARICOM COUNTRIES
R. L. CHAUDHARY*
In the following pages an attempt will be made to consider not only
the legal position of strikes, but also the law with regard to picketing in
Caricom countries.' Prior to the enactment of labour law statutes in Cari-
corn countries, 2 any agreement to persuade workmen to break their con-
tract with their employer was an offence of criminal conspiracy. These
statutes for the first time granted to workers' organisations the right to
declare strikes and to do certain things in furtherance of trade disputes.
They are based to a considerable extent on the English trade union stat-
utes which were in operation prior to the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. Thus,
it seems appropriate to trace the development of the law of strikes and
picketing both in England and in Caricom countries.
STRIKES
Discussing the subject of strikes and agreements to strike prior to
the passing of the Trade Union Act, 1871,3 in relation to the law of con-
spiracy, Sir William Erie stated: "The tendency to combine for the pur-
pose of raising or lowering wages appears from the manifold statutes
passed for the purpose of adjusting a current rate of wages on some basis
other than free competition. These statutes have long since been repealed.
While they were in force, they tended to prevent a resort to the common
law remedy for conspiracy, and the records of proceedings under the
common law against conspirators for the purpose of restraining freedom
for labour are not numerous; but still there are authorities sufficient to
show what the law is in this matter."
4
The case of Walsby v. Anley5 has a bearing on this point. Walsby
combined with other workmen to leave the employ of Anley simultane-
ously unless he discharged certain workmen. They thus conspired to coerce
*B.A., LL.B., Delhi University; LL.M., Ph.D. (Law), London University;
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Anley's will in the exercise of his right to a free course of trade in re-
spect of hiring and discharging employees. Crompton and Hill, JJ. held
that this was a conspiracy indictable at common law. The question was
raised by an appeal against a conviction for endeavouring by threats to
force the employer to limit the number of his workmen. The words of
the alleged threat were "Unless the men who are working under the
declaration be discharged, we cease to work immediately." The objection
to the conviction was that it was no threat because each had a right to
leave singly, and it was contended that it followed that all had a right
to leave simultaneously. The objection was overruled by all judges but on
different grounds: by the Chief Justice on the ground that a notice of an
intended simultaneous work stoppage with the prohibited intent was a
criminal threat within the statute (i.e., Section 3 of the Combination Act,
1825). But Crompton and Hill, JJ. held that the threat must be of an
illegal act and that a combination for a simultaneous work stoppage was
an obstruction of the free course of trade and a crime. Crompton, J. re-
ferred to his judgment in Hilton v. Eckersley that combinations of work-
men "were illegal and indictable at common law, as tending directly to
impede and interfere with the free course of trade and manufacture"
6
and affirmed its correctness.
From the aforesaid authorities it appears that the crime of conspiracy
consists of two elements- namely, an intention and an agreement by two
or more to execute it. An intention to use such coercion as is described
above to be unlawful, against any person in the exercise of his right to
freedom to trade is sufficient as to the first element of conspiracy; the
making of the agreement to execute the intention completes the offence.
The mere intention, without some act equivalent to an attempt to execute
it, does not suffice, but the outward act by which mutual consent to an
agreement is interchanged is sufficient to complete the offence. If this
reasoning is correct, the common law in force since the Combination Act,
1825, secures to every person freedom to follow his own will as to working
and employment and also as to combining with others in respect of wages
and hours, and for all other lawful purposes; but he has no right, either
by himself or in combination with others, to use unlawful means in order
to coerce the will of another party to prevent him from working or em-
ploying as he may choose. One may also add that probably he has no
right to apply the power of combination for the purpose either of malicious
damage or of unjust extortion, although he uses no unlawful means except
combining to obstruct the free course of trade in order to effect such
purpose.
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In the case of Sorrell v. Smith,7 there are dicta which tend to sup-
port the view that the element of motive is material in the case of
conspiracy. That case deals with the law of conspiracy as it affects the
relationship between traders and therefore cannot be quoted as a precedent
in a case in which the relationship is that between employer and em-
ployees. Besides, what was discussed in that case was civil conspiracy
and not criminal conspiracy. Nonetheless, in a general discussion on the
crime of conspiracy at common law the dicta referred to are instructive
and suggestive. Lord Dunedin observed: " . . . Now, the result of those
cases,8 in my mind, is this: In the first place, every one has the right to
conduct his own business upon his own lines, and as suits him best, even
although the result may be that he interferes with other people's business
in so doing. That general proposition, I think, may be gathered from the
Mogul case. Secondly, an act that is legal in itself will not be made illegal
because the motive of the act may be bad. That is the result, I think, of
Allen v. Flood. Thirdly, even although the dominating motive in a certain
course of action may be the furtherance of your own business or your
own interests, as you conceive those interests to lie, you are not entitled
to interfere with another man's method of gaining his living by illegal
means, and illegal means may either be means that are illegal in them-
selves or that may (become illegal because of conspiracy where they would
not have been illegal if done by a single individual). I think that is the
result of Quinn v. Leatham . .
Concurring with what was said by Atkin, L.J. in Wade and de Fre-
vile,'0 Lord Dunedin stated: "It appears to me," be says, "to be beyond
dispute that the effect of the two decisions in Allen v. Flood and Quinn
v. Leatham is this: that on the one hand a lawful act done by one does
not become unlawful if done with an intent to injure another, (whereas an
otherwise lawful act done by two or more in combination does become
unlawful if done by two or more in combination with intent to injure
another) . . ."" Lord Dunedin continued: ". . . My Lords, it may seem
self-confident to be positive when so many learned persons have expressed
other views, but candidly I never held a clearer opinion than the one I
now express, that the effect of Allen v. Flood and Quinn v. Leatham is
to settle beyond dispute that in an action against an individual for injury
he has caused to the plaintiff by his action, the whole question is whether
the act complained of was legal, and the motive or intent is immaterial;
but that in an action against a set of persons in combination, a con-
spiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will give a good cause for
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action, (and motive or intent when the act itself is not illegal is of the
essence of the conspiracy) .- 12
Lord Dunedin suggested that the reason why motive was immaterial
in the case of an action done by one person and became material when
the act was done by two or more in combination was that the essence of
conspiracy on which civil action is founded is a criminal conspiracy.
Discussing this point, his Lordship stated "I would like to add that to say
that a conspiracy to found the civil action must be criminal, i.e., an in-
dictable conspiracy, is not tantamount to saying that in each and every
case you might expect a jury if the case were tried in a criminal court
to return a verdict of guilty. In many cases they might and probably
would think that the civil remedy was sufficient."13
In the case of Regina v. Bunn14 Lord Esher, commenting on the
legal status of a strike which inflicts hardship on the public, said: "You
must not allow yourselves to be influenced in coming to a conclusion
whether these defendants are guilty or not by the view that from there
being an agreement between the defendants to cease work it would have
had a most lamentable effect upon City and public. I entirely agree that
so far as these men were the servants of the gas company, they had no
obligation whatever with regard to the public. . . . They had entered
into no agreement with the public, the public paid them nothing for
their labour, and they were under no further obligation to the public
than any other of the Queen's subjects."
It is said that the correctness of the law as stated in the aforesaid
passage was never questioned, though some of Lord Esher's dicta in that
case were disapproved in the case of Gibson v. Lawson15.
There is, therefore, authority for saying that a strike, the purpose or
motive of which is the infliction of malicious injury or possibly of wanton
damage, may be illegal conspiracy at common law, but that the mere
fact that the result of a strike is, or may reasonably be expected to be,
the infliction of injury on the community or any individual or individuals
does not make a strike an illegal conspiracy. The motive or purpose of
any given strike is, of course, a question of fact or, as Lord Dunedin
expressed it, "a piece of evidence." If the "real root" of a strike was
the infliction of malicious injury, it might be illegal at common law. If,
however, the "real root" was to further a trade dispute, the strike would
not be illegal.
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There seems to be no direct authority that any other type of strike
is illegal at common law, but any strike which amounts to a conspiracy
to commit a crime will, of course, be a criminal conspiracy at common
law, and the participants in it will be liable to indictment. For example,
though it is not very probable, a strike might be a conspiracy to commit
treason; further, in very exceptional circumstances, it might constitute
a seditious conspiracy. One may add that a strike cannot be used as a
cloak for acts which are otherwise criminal. Accordingly, strikers who,
as a result of a strike or in furtherance of it, commit breaches of peace or
become parties to a riot or an unlawful assembly, are liable to punishment
in the same way as any other individuals.
The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, was the first
piece of legislation in England to make the law of criminal conspiracy as
such entirely inapplicable to trade union activities. In particular, section
3 of the Act provided:
"An agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or
procure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute . . . shall not be indictable as a conspiracy if such act committed
by one person would not be punishable as a crime . .."
Section 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (U.K.), added the fol-
lowing new paragraph after the above-mentioned paragraph of Section 3
of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875:
"An act done in pursuance of an agreement or combination by two
or more persons shall, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute, not be actionable unless the act, if done without any such
agreement or combination, would be actionable."
The aforesaid provisions are included in the first and second para-
graphs of Section 5 of the Trade Union Act, 1963 (Barbados), Section
8 of the Trade Unions Ordinance (Guyana), Section 6 of the Protec-
tion of Property Law (Jamaica) and Section 7 of the Trade Disputes and
Protection of Property Ordinance (Trinidad & Tobago).
The first paragraph of the above sections protects trade unionists
from prosecution for criminal conspiracy where the agreement into which
they have entered is riot an agreement to commit an offence. Accord-
ingly, a distinction is made between trade combinations and other com-
binations, by virtue of which it is not 'a criminal conspiracy if "in
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" a number of persons
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combine to do a particular thing, that is, to break a contract. But if a
group of persons combines to break a contract in furtherance of some
other object, it might well be a criminal conspiracy.
One may paraphrase the second paragraph of these sections by stat-
ing that strikes or combinations to induce strikes are not to be civilly
actionable unless the acts of strikers or of the persons inducing others to
strike would be actionable if done by a single person.
Summing up the effect of these sections, it may be said that so long
as a strike is "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute" and
does not constitute a conspiracy for which a punishment is awarded by
law or renders the participants in it liable to punishment in respect of
such a conspiracy or in respect of the crimes of rioting or breach of the
peace or of any offence against the State or the Sovereign, it is neither
indictable nor actionable.
Strikes not in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute will
be considered next. A trade dispute means any dispute between employers
and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected
with the employment vel non, the terms of the employment, or the con-
ditions of labour, of any person.1"
The limits within which acts can be held to be done in contempla-
tion or furtherance of a trade dispute were discussed in Conway v. Wade. 17
So far as that case purports to determine what acts are done in con-
templation or furtherance of a "trade dispute" as defined in section 5(3)
of the 1906 Act, it is equally applicable to Section 3 of the 1875 Act.
In that case the trouble arose from an attempt of a union official to
compel a recalcitrant member to pay a fine imposed by the union for
breach of its rules and to punish him for not paying it. The House of
Lords held that there was no trade dispute. Lord Loreburn, with whom
Lords Gorrell and Macnaghten concurred, stated: "A mere personal
quarrel or a grumbling or an agitation will not suffice. It must be
something fairly definite and of real substance."1 Lord Loreburn also
pointed out that Section 5(3) of the 1906 Act did not apply unless a
trade dispute was in existence or imminent, and further, that it applied
only to acts done by persons interested in the dispute. The acts of a
mere meddler were not protected.
The case of Conway v. Wade has always been taken as authority for
establishing that the immunity formula in the 1906 Act covered any dis.
pute over the usual subjects of industrial disagreement including a
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"!sympathetic strike", e.g., a strike of workmen employed by one employer
in support of workmen engaged in a dispute with another employer. In
any event, the meaning of the word "workman" as used in the definition
of "trade dispute" makes it reasonably clear that a sympathetic strike is
an act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, and as
such comes within the protection of the Act. That being so, the only
strikes which are not acts done "in contemplation or furtherance of a
trade dispute" are strikes quite unconnected with trade disputes.
It appears that in the aforesaid case Lord Loreburn's "meddler" and
the requirement of "workmen" as essential parties to a "trade dispute"
proved to be a dangerous combination in the hands of courts which still
regarded unions as meddlers inclined to take advantage of, rather than
act for, workers. 9 However, that line of argument was put to rest by
Lord Wright in 1943 when he stated in the course of his judgment in
N.A.L.G.O. v. Bolton Corporation: "It would be strangely out of date
to hold, as was argued, that a trade union cannot act on behalf of its
members in a trade dispute, or that a difference between a trade union
acting for its members and their employers cannot be a trade dispute.
20
Support for Lord Wright's above-mentioned views is to be found in
the judgment of the Privy Council in Bird v. O'Neal,21 a case from the
Leeward Islands. To the present purpose the relevant facts were that a
woman clerk at the respondent's drug store, employed on a weekly basis,
was summarily dismissed with a week's wages in lieu of notice. In
determining the legal status of the picketing that supervened, one of the
questions arising was whether there was a trade dispute in furtherance of
which the pickets had acted. It was argued that "there can be no trade
dispute between a dismissed employee and a dismissing employer if the
dismissal was lawful (i.e., if the period of notice required by law is
given or payment in lieu thereof made)-.22 This contention was rejected
by the trial judge, but was upheld by the West Indian Court of Appeal.
However, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, relying on the
N.A.L.G.O. case said: "Their Lordships . . . agree with the trial judge's
rejection of submission that the lawful dismissal of a workman cannot be
the. subject of, atrade dispute." 23
Somewhat the same issue was raised in Beetham v. Trinidad Cement
Ltd.24 In that case the respondent company employed three hundred or
so.men ini a factory in Trinidad. The Federated Workers' Trade Union
had been successful in organising two hundred of these men. The re-
spondent company dismissed two union employees and ignored all re-
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quests of the union to discuss the dismissal. At this point, the basis of
the difference between the union and company, originally confined to
the question of ad hoc recognition of the union for the purpose of acting
on behalf of the dismissed men, was widened. The union claimed general
recognition to bargain on behalf of the company's manual workers, but
the company refused absolutely to give any recognition to the union.
A Board of Inquiry was set up to inquire into a trade dispute. Before
the inquiry could proceed, its jurisdiction was successfully challenged on
the ground that there was no trade dispute. In its turn, however, the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council said that the recognition dispute
was a "trade dispute" and rejected the argument that a recognition dis-
pute was a dispute between an employer and the union seeking recogni-
tion, rather than between "employers and workmen" within the terms of
the Act.
The ruling of the Privy Council in Beetham's case that a recognition
dispute is a "trade dispute" was subsequently approved obiter both by
the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in Stratlord & Soru Ltd. v.
Lindley.25 In the latter case officials of the Watermen's Union told their
members not to handle barges belonging to or being repaired by the
plaintiff, because he had concluded a collective agreement with a rival
union. The officials were held by the House of Lords not to have been
acting "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute". In the Court
of Appeal, Lord Denning, with whom the other members of the court
concurred, said: "[W]henever a trade union claims recognition (or nego-
tiation rights, as it is sometimes called) on behalf of its members, and
an employer declines to recognize that claim, there is a trade dispute
within the Act."26 However, the House of Lords considered it important
that the union did not make any formal claim for rights on the plaintiff
before the embargo was imposed. Having failed to do so, the union could
not purport to have taken action in contemplation or furtherance of a
dispute over the plaintiff's failure to accede.
From the above discussion it may be concluded that the only strikes
which are not acts done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute" are strikes quite unconnected with trade disputes. It does not
seem easy to classify such strikes, but perhaps the following categories
would include most types of strikes which are at all likely to occur:
1. A strike conducted for the purpose of causing malicious
damage. Such a strike is illegal.
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2. A strike which constitutes well-recognised crimes against the
State. Such a strike includes seditious conspiracy and is illegal.
3. A strike for political purposes. Such a strike, if it does not
come within category 2, is probably legal.
4. A strike for purely personal motives. If such a strike does
not fall into category 1, it is probably legal.
PICKETING
The term "picketing" though familiar to most people is rarely de-
fined. In statutes which deal with the subject, it is used only once and
then only in a sidenote. The Jamaican Trade Union Law defines "picket-
ing" as "attendance at or near any house or place in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or
communicating information or of peacefully persuading any person to work
or not to work." 27
In Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners, 28 Madden, J. observed
that the more accurate expression is said to be "watching and besetting";
but picketing in the popular sense has always been understood to mean
the attempt by trade unionists and others to induce workmen to stop work.
In the case of strikes, the attempt is made by posting a "picket" of one
or more persons, outside the works against which the strike is in progress,
for the purpose of getting in touch with men who remain at work when
these men are coming or going from their work. Other activities such as
visiting the houses of men who remain at work or following them through
the streets, are also resorted to at times with the same object.
In England, the law with regard to picketing is found in section 7
of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, and the second
section of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906. These will be dealt with after
considering the terms of earlier enactments on the subject, as they give
some assistance in construing section 7 of the 1875 Act. Section 7, except
insofar as it is modified or repealed by section 2 of the 1906 Act and by
the 1927 Act, is still in force.
The earlier enactments are section 3 of the Combination Laws Repeal
Act Amendment, 1825,29 the Molestation of Workmen, 1859,30 and section
1 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871. 3 1
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Section 3 of the Combination Laws Repeal Act Amendment, 182512
may be summarised by saying that it is an offence:
(1) to use violence to person or property;
(2) to threaten or intimidate person or property;
(3) to molest or obstruct persons with any one of the following
purposes -
(a) to force workmen in employment to cease working or to
force such as are not employed to refuse employment.
(b) to induce workmen to join certain associations or to pay
certain fines as a penalty for not doing so or for failure to
conform to certain regulations relating to work or wages or
kindred matters.
It is said that the effect of section 3 of the Combination Laws Repeal
Act Amendment, 1825, 33 seems to have been to convert into crimes certain
acts which were previously torts, when these acts were done for certain
specified purposes. For instance, violence to a person was a crime when
the Act was passed, and violence to property was a tort.
The expressions "molest" and "obstruct" were too indefinite to be
satisfactory. On a strict interpretation of the words, the section might have
been held to make all persons attempting, by any means, however inno-
cent, to induce others to join in a strike, guilty of a crime. In order to
avoid this result, the Molestation of Workmen, 185934 was passed. It reads
as follows:
No workman or other persons, whether actually in employment
or not, shall, by reason merely of his entering into an agreement
with any workman or workmen, or other person or persons, for the
purpose of fixing or endeavouring to fix the rate of wages or re-
muneration at which they or any of them shall work, or by reason
merely of his endeavouring peaceably, and in a reasonable manner,
and without threat or intimidation, direct or indirect, to persuade
others to cease or abstain from work, in order to obtain the rate of
wages or the altered hours of labour so fixed or agreed upon, shall
be deemed or taken to be guilty of 'molestation' or 'obstruction'
within the meaning of the said Act (Combination Laws Repeal Act
Amendment, 1825), and shall not therefore be subject or liable to any
prosecution or indictment for conspiracy, provided always that nothing
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therein contained shall authorise any workmen to break or depart
from any contract or authorise any attempt to induce any workman
to break or depart from any contract.
Even after the passing of this Act, the position was not considered
satisfactory. Ultimately the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1871, was
passed in which some attempt was made to explain the terms "molest"
and "obstruct" and to define the expression "threaten or intimidate".
As in the Combination Laws Repeal Act Amendment, 1825, violence,
threats, intimidation, molestation and obstruction are dealt with, but with
the difference that in the 1871 Act violence, threats and intimidation
(within the limits specified by the Act) are made criminal regardless of
the object'for which they are used. It may be doubted that this portion
of the Act made any alteration in common law.
Molestation and obstruction are made criminal under somewhat sim-
ilar circumstances as under the Combination Laws Repeal Act Amendment,
1825. The explanation of the terms "molestation" and "obstruction", how-
ever,. is important. They include:
(1) persistently following persons about;
(2) hiding tools, clothes, etc.;
(3) watching or besetting houses or other places where persons work.
Discussing the above-mentioned enactments in the case of Larkin v.
Bellast Harbour Commissioners,35 Madden, J. pointed out; "The dangers
arising from trade combination as a possible cause of molestation were
realised from the time at which they were rendered lawful. 36 Act 5 Geo 4,
C. 95 (Combination Laws Repeal, 1824) was shortly afterwards replaced
by 6 Geo. 4, C. 129 (Combination Laws Repeal Act Amendment, 1825),
which provides a summary remedy in cases of molestation or obstruction.
Afterwards, in order to remove doubts which had arisen as to the meaning
of the words "molestation" and "obstruction" it was enacted by 22 Vict.
C. 34 (Molestation of Workmen, 1859) that no person by reason merely
of his endeavouring peaceably and in a reasonable manner, and without
threats or intimidation, direct or indirect, to persuade others to cease or
abstain from work, in order to obtain the rate of wages or altered hours
of labour, agreed to by him and others, should be deemed to have been
guilty of "molestation" or "obstruction". This statute, which recognised
to a certain extent'the position of the peaceful picketer, was repealed by
the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1871'... (which) was in its turn
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replaced by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875, which
was the governing statute until the passing of the Act of 1906."
Section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875,
runs as follows:
Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to
abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a
legal right to do or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without
legal authority -
(1) Uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or
children, or injures his property; or
(2) persistently follows such other person about from place to place;
or
(3) hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such
other person, or deprives him of or hinders him in the use
thereof; or
i4) watches or besets the house or other place where such other per-
son resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be,
or the approach to such house or place; or
(5) follows such other person with two or more persons in a dis-
orderly manner in or through any street or road, shall on con-
viction thereof by a Court of summary jurisdiction, or on in-
dictment as hereinafter mentioned, be liable either to pay a
penalty not exceeding twenty pounds, or to be imprisoned for a
term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labour.
Attending at or near the house or place where a person resides
or works or carries on business or happens to be or the approach to
such house or place in order merely to obtain or communicate in-
formation shall not be deemed a watching or besetting within the
meaning of this section.
Provisions similar to those contained in section 7 of the Conspiracy
and Protection of Property Act, 1875, except its last paragraph, are in-
corporated in Section 40 of the Trade Union Act, 1963 (Barbados),
Section 27(1) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) (Guyana), Section
30(1) of the Trade Union Law (Jamaica), and Section 4 of the Trade
Disputes and Protection of Property Ordinance (Trinidad & Tobago).
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Section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875
(U.K.), was discussed in Lyons & Sons v. Wilkin. 7 In that case the de-
fendant unionists had given the plaintiff, their employer, proper notice,
left their jobs and proceeded to picket his works in furtherance of their
dispute with him. They carried placards and tried to persuade others not
to go into the works. On one occasion some of the pickets stopped an
errand boy and opened the bag which he carried, and, on another, followed
people into the works.
In the Court of Appeal, Lindley, L. J. held that the pickets were at
Mr. Lyon's works to put pressure on him, not merely to communicate
information. Lord Lindley, M. R. pointed out: "It would be wrong to post
people about a place of business or a house under pretense of merely
obtaining or communicating information, if the object and effect were to
compel the person so picketed not to do what he has a perfect right to
do." 38
In 1899, an action was taken to have the injunction made perpetual.
Lord Lindley, M.R. once again delivering the judgment said: "This sec-
tion (i.e., S. 7 of the 1875 Act) is a penal section, and the words wrong-
fully and without legal authority must be inserted in an indictment or
information framed on the enactment, and the specific acts which the
complainant was to be compelled to do or not to do ought also to be
specified in a conviction by a magistrate... Moreover, if on the trial the
evidence before the court is consistent with the legality of the acts com-
plained of, this reasonably possible legality must be excluded by evidence
before the accused can be properly convicted. But it is not necessary to
show the illegality of [he overt acts complained of by other evidence than
that which proves the acts themselves, if no justification or excuse for
them is reasonably consistent with the facts proved ... That this is the
correct method of construing and dealing with the words wrongfully and
without lawful (sic) authority in S. 7 is, in my opinion, perfectly plain. '3 9
Lord Lindley continued: "The truth is that to watch or beset a man's
house with a view to compel him to do or not to do what is lawful for him
not to do or to do is wrongful and without lawful authority unless some
reasonable justification for it is consistent with the evidence. Such conduct
seriously interferes with the ordinary comfort of human existence and
ordinary enjoyment of the house beset, and such conduct would support
an action on the case for a nuisance at common law."
40
Chitty, L.J. agreed with Lindley, M.R. as to the manner in which the
section should be construed. His Lordship also agreed that the watching
STRIKES AND PICKETING IN CARICOM
and besetting proved in the case was wrongful at common law as con-
stituting a nuisance. He stated further that in his opinion the words
"wrongfully and without legal authority" were inserted to provide for the
case where there is some unexpected legal justification for the act. Ac-
cordingly, he considered all watching and besetting to be illegal except
where it came within the proviso allowing for the communication of
information, and in his view attending in order to persuade is not within
the proviso.
41
In ard, Lock and Co. v. Operative Printers Assistants' Society,
4 2
however, the Court of Appeal took a different view. In that case the
defendants had stationed themselves around the plaintiff's works with the
object of persuading his workmen to join the union and then determine
their employment by proper notice. Their aim was to compel the plaintiff
to stop employing non-unionists. An action was brought for damages and
an injunction to restrain pickets from inducing breaches of contract,
committing nuisance and watching and besetting contrary to Section 7(4)
of the 1875 Act. The Court of Appeal held that there was not sufficient
evidence to support a finding of nuisance, and that the pickets had not
invited the men to break their contracts.
Vaughan Williams, L.J. said: "I think there is evidence that the
defendants both induced workmen to join the union, and employed pickets
to watch and beset the printing premises with a view to compel the plain-
tiffs to become employers of unionists, and to abstain from employing
non-unionists. The evidence shows this to have been done without causing
violence, obstruction, or otherwise a common law nuisance ... and there
is no evidence of the pickets having incited workmen to break their con-
tracts. The question therefore arises, assuming that there is evidence that
the defendants employed the pickets in furtherance of a purpose of view
such as I have mentioned, but proposed to carry it out by inducing work-
men to join the union and then to determine their service by a seven days'
notice as provided in the contract, unless the plaintiffs would consent to
raise their wages, would this give the plaintiffs, if the case be proved, a
good cause of action? ... in my opinion, such conduct as I have described
... does not constitute a criminal offence within sub-section 4 (of section
7 of the 1875 Act). When the Act of 1875 was passed, the employers had
a good cause of action for various forms of nuisance. The Legislature, by
the Act of 1875, gave in respect of some of these nuisances, as to which
there was a civil remedy, a summary remedy... And it seems to me that
the words in the first clause of the section 'wrongfully and without legal
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authority' were introduced for the very purpose of limiting the remedy by
criminal prosecution to cases so tortious as to give a civil remedy.
43
Moulton, L.J. agreed, saying: "I cannot see that this section affects
or is intended to affect civil rights or civil remedies. It legalises nothing,
and it renders nothing wrongful that was not so before. Its object is solely
to visit certain selected classes of acts which were previously wrongful, i.e.
were at least civil torts, with penal consequences capable of being sum-
marily inflicted."44
The inconsistency between Lyons and Sons v. Wilkins and Ward,
Lock & Co. v. O.P.A.S. was never completely cleared up, in the sense that
no court had to decide finally between the two views. 45 The judicial con-
flict was avoided by the introduction of section 2 of the Trade Disputes
Act, 1906 (U.K.), which repealed the last paragraph of section 7 of the
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (U.K.), and enacted in
its stead:
2(1) It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting on their own
behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of an individual employer or
firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at
or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries
on business or happens to be, if they so attend merely for the purpose
of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or of peace-
fully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.
Section 2(1) contains the germ of "lawful picketing". It enacts that
attending at or near the house or place where a person resides or works
or carries on business or happens to be in order merely to obtain or com-
municate information, is not to be regarded as watching or besetting. Its
sole effect therefore is to protect pickets in the circumstances therein
specified from the penal consequences imposed by the section on watching
or besetting. The other actions which are made criminal offences by virtue
of section 7 (i.e. violence or intimidation, persistent following, hiding of
tools and following persons in a disorderly manner) are not legalised in
any way. Stating the extent to which watching and besetting are legalised,
in, the case of Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners,46 Madden, J.
observed: "The 7th section of the Act of 1875 provided, or rather con-
tinued in operation, a summary procedure by which watching or besetting
could be punished, if carried into effect.., with a view to compel any
other persons to abstain from doing so or to do any act which such other
persons had a legal right to do or abstain from doing... Picketing of this
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class was always regarded as an offence against the criminal law, punish-
able on indictment ... By a paragraph in the same section of the Act of
1875, the Legislature dealt with - watching or besetting - in these words,
"attending at or near the house or place where a person resides or works,
carries on business or happens to be, or the approach to such house or
place, in order merely to obtain or communicate information, shall not
be deemed a watching or besetting within the meaning of this section."
It will be observed that watching or besetting, for the purpose of obtaining
or communicating information, is not by these words rendered lawful -for
all purposes; as, for example, in its relation to the law of nuisance; but
only for the purposes of the section in which this -provision occurs.
Provisions substantially identical with those in section 2(1) of -the
Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (U.K.) are found in the Barbados Trade Union
Act, 1963,y7 the Guyana Summary Jurisdiction (Offences),"1 the Jamaica
Trade Union Law,4 9 and the Trinidad & Tobago Trade Disputes and
Protection of Property Ordinance. 50
Dealing with section 2(1) of the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (U.K.),
in Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners,51 Madden, J. said: "The
effect of this section is, in my opinion, perfectly clear. It legalised for the
first time, by positive enactment, a course of action which might otherwise,
if carried out in a certain manner, have amounted to a nuisance at com-
mon law, provided such course of action is resorted to merely for effecting
certain specified peaceful purposes ... Watching might so be carried out
as not to involve a nuisance, but the word 'beset' almost necessarily con-
notes an interference with the common law right of the owner of the house
or business premises beset, to the enjoyment of his property."
Larkin's case decided that section 2(1) of the Trade Disputes Act,
1906, did not legalise trespass. The decision was unanimous, but it must
be added that Madden, 3. was the only member of the Court who found
it necessary to say that the sub-section legalised nuisance. That learned
judge found in effect that the object of the section was to legalise nuisance
within certain limits and not to legalise trespass. "It sounded in nuisance
and not in trespass." The other learned judges, including Lord O'Brien,
L.C.J. based their decision on the somewhat narrow ground (in which
Madden, J. concurred) that the words used in the sub-section were "at or
near" and not "in or upon."
It appears therefore that the statutory authority given by the above.
mentioned sections (i.e., section 2 of the British Trade Disputes Act, 1906,
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section 39 of the Barbados Trade Union Act, section 27 of the Guyana
Summary Jurisdiction (Offences), section 31 of the Jamaica Trade Union
Law, and section 3 of the Trinidad and Tobago Trade Disputes and
Protection of Property Ordinance) for pickets to attend at or near the
place where a person works or resides in contemplation or furtherance of
a trade dispute, is confined to immediate proximity of the place and does
not permit or authorize an entry into the house or place of business,
against the will of the owner, for such purpose. The pickets may meet the
workman when he is going to his place of work or coming away from it;
and they may succeed in peacefully persuading him to go to work or to
strike as the case may be. But the provisions of these sections fall short
of giving authority to enter the house or place. They do not permit any
right to commit trespass which is an offence at common law.
Although the aforesaid sections do not legalise trespass, they neutralise
trespass to the highway. 52 But where the pickets by their size or conduct
obstruct the general use of the highway, they will be criminally guilty of
obstruction to the public highway53 and of public nuisance; and a police
officer who, in the course of a trade dispute, reasonably anticipates a
breach of peace may restrict the number of pickets.A4 If intimidation or
violence is used, then criminal and civil liabilities may arise.
A question arises whether picketing suppliers in an effort to persuade
them to stop supplies to the employer in dispute or customers to dissuade
them from going into a shop, theatre or restaurant in dispute, falls within
the purview of the above-mentioned sections. In relation to such picketing
those sections cover only "peacefully obtaining or communicating infor-
mation." Peaceful persuasion of suppliers or customers does not seem to
fall within those sections.
Although peaceful persuasion does not in itself turn picketing into an
actionable nuisance or crimes of "intimidation" or "watching and beset-
ting,"5 5 in the case of picketing suppliers, peaceful persuasion of an in.
coming truck-driver at the factory gate to go back in breach of his con-
tract of service may implicate the pickets in liability for indirectly
procuring a breach of the commercial contract between the employer of
the truck-driver and the employer in dispute. 56 Inducing breach of the
truck-driver's own contract of service, if done in contemplation or further-
ance of a trade dispute, does not itself involve the pickets in liability.
In relation to picketing customers, where the persuasion or communi-
cation attains a point of aggressiveness or obstruction such that access to
the picketed premises may be considered to be unreasonably blocked, the
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torts of nuisance, individually and collectively, and of conspiracy in its
narrow form will be employed. Furthermore, any additional acts of a
tortious or criminal nature accompanying the method of picketing may
involve the responsible person in liability.
The question of the legality of picketing was discussed in Ryan v.
Cooke & Quinn.57 In that case the defendants, on behalf of the Irish Union
of Distributive Workers and Clerks, sought and obtained permission from
the plaintiff, Mrs. Ryan, the owner of a chain of twenty-one shops in the
retail dairy and creamery business in Dublin (including the "Monument
Creamery"), to canvass her assistants to become members of their trade
union. Notwithstanding their efforts, no members of Mrs. Ryan's staff
joined the union. Two years later the union wrote to Mrs. Ryan asking
her for an assurance that she would only employ trade union labour and
would observe trade union conditions. As no reply was received to this
effect, pickets were placed on the premises. The pickets displayed placards
bearing gross misrepresentations that "the Monument Creamery refuses to
employ trade union staff." There was no evidence to show any awakening
of interest in the union among the Creamery's assistants.
Johnston, J. held that the dissemination of such falsehoods was wrong-
ful and harmful, and that this was not peaceful picketing since the
picketing was being conducted by unlawful means. He further held that
on the evidence there was no "trade dispute" within the meaning of the
statute in existence58 and that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction
restraining the defendants from picketing the premises on the ground
of nuisance.
The decision in the aforesaid case was followed in Brendan Dunne
Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick.9 The facts of that case were that prior to the year
1956, Brendan Dunne carried on the business of an interior decorator,
furniture designer and furniture salesman in Dorset Street, Dublin. He
employed a staff who were paid a basic wage and, in addition, received
a bonus calculated on the yearly profits of the business. In the month of
May, 1956, Mr. Dunne's employees suggested to him that the premises
should remain open after the usual business hours on Thursday evenings
each week for the purpose of facilitating the public and with a view of
improving business. Mr. Dunne agreed to the suggestion and thereafter
the premises opened for business on Thursday evenings from 7.30 p.m.
to 10 p.m. Later in the year 1956, the business was transferred to premises
in Dawson Street and was made into a limited company. The arrangement
as to late hours of trading on Thursdays was continued. Mr. Fitzpatrick,
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the Secretary of the Irish Union of Distributive Workers & Clerks, re-
quested the company that the practice of late openings on Thursdays be
discontinued. The company refused to comply with his request, whereupon
a large number of union members grouped together and paraded in Daw-
son Street on Thursday evenings until 10 p.m. Some of the members of
these groups carried placards which read: "Support Shops which open
at 9 a.m. and close at 5.30 p.m."; "You can buy contemporary furniture
in trade union shops"; '"Trade Union shops open from 9 to 5.30"; "Con-
temporary furniture? Contemporary closing 5.30 p.m.!" Mr. Fitzpatrick,
on behalf of workers in the furiture trade who were members of the union,
wrote to the staff of the company requesting them to refuse to work during
hours outside those generally recognised by the trade, but without success.
The parades were continued; the number of persons taking part in the
parades varied, on occasions exceeding sixty, and generally exceeding
twenty.
It was held that the parades constituted a form of picketing which
was unlawful unless justified by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (U.K.).
Budd, J. further pointed out that the picketing was unlawful in that (i)
the premises had been picketed by unreasonable numbers of persons and
that (ii) some of the placards carried by the members of the picket in-
vited or recommended the public to support concerns other than those of
the company.
The legality of picketing was also discussed by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council in Bird v. O'Neal. ° In that case Miss Averyl Winter,
a clerk employed on a weekly basis at a drug store run by Miss O'Neal,
was lawfully dismissed without reason with a week's wages in lieu of
notice. An official of the Antigua Trades and Labour Union of which Miss
Winter was a member, sought to mediate with a view to obtain her rein-
statement or compensation. Miss O'Neal refused either to reinstate or
compensate Miss Winter. When efforts to secure for Miss Winter rein-
statement or compensation through government conciliation and inquiry
machinery proved to be ineffective, the executive committee of the union
decided to picket the premises of the drug store. Six persons were paid to
engage in picketing, among them the defendants Samuel (chief picket)
and Joseph (the organizer). The pickets were led to their posts by Joseph
and instructed to shout behind customers entering the store "Don't buy
from O'Neals Drug Store." Pickets also threatened customers with vio-
lence. Samuel told customers that they would get into trouble if they
entered the store, and to one he said, "Nelson, don't you hear you must
not go in there to buy- you is a dog." All the time the pickets tried, by
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threats and shouting, to "hold the line," which Samuel explained meant
that nobody was to go into the drug store.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the concurrent
findings of facts established beyond doubt that intimidation and threats of
violence were used by the pickets to an extent which amounted to an
actionable nuisance. It further held that evidence showed that Joseph and
Samuel were present and actively assisting in picketing which constituted
a nuisance and had caused damage to Miss O'Nears trade, and that they
were therefore each responsible for the tort in the commission of which
they had assisted and were liable in damages for £80, and subject to an
injunction against the continued commission of the nuisance.
A critic of the statutory provisions 1 which authorize picketing for
the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information or of
peaceful persuasion may argue that:
1. These provisions, by giving positive legality to attendance
for a specified purpose, can be used in such a manner that even
nuisance and trespass would be authorized;
2. The presence of pickets, especially in large numbers, is
likely to raise the passions of both the pickets and the picketed; and
3. It may be a serious annoyance and obstruction to persons
whose premises are picketed.
One may set at rest the fears expressed in argument (1) by refer-
ring to Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Commissioners, where the judgment
shows that any fears as regards trespass have not been realised. The
statutory provisions have legalised what would at common law be a
nuisance. As to arguments (2) and (3), one may say that the ruling in
Brendan Dunne Ltd. v. Fitzpatrick shows that the presence of pickets,
in large numbers, is not necessary for the mere purpose of peaceful
persuasion and will not be tolerated by the law.
CONCLUSION
The statutory law as to industrial relations in Caricon countries
discloses a policy of abstention of the law which is revealed in the Bar.
bados Trade Union Act, the Guyana Trades Unions Ordinance, the Ja-
maica Trade Union Law, and the Trinidad & Tobago Trade Unions Ordi-
nance and the Trade Disputes and Protection of Property Ordinance.
When industrial conflict occurs, on failure to achieve settlement, the right
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to strike exists in these countries, and strikers are protected from prose-
cution or civil actions on the grounds specified in these statutes.
However, in so-called essential services no such right to strike is
guaranteed. The main issue relating to collective bargaining in essential
services is that of the status of strikes whereby public access to these
services is curtailed or interrupted. The notion of essentiality for these
purposes goes beyond the concept of convenience or economic interest
to a more importunate set of services, curtailment of which may involve
the destruction of property or risk to the physical health or safety of
members of the public. If this notion were to be expanded to embody
inconvenience and economic interests, the concept of strikes as an in-
strument of dispute settlement would be displaced. However, in some
services, such as fire and hospital, interruption of which involves too
great a risk of public detriment to justify its value as a dispute settlement
device, prohibition of work stoppages may be justified. But in most other
services which are at present listed as essential services in the statute
books of some of the above-mentioned countries such as water supply,
electricity, transportation, communication, etc., it does not seem necessary
to designate by law a prohibition against strike action. In this area, if
a strike leads to serious interruption of services which involves severe
hardship to the public, government may take ad hoc legislative action to
direct the termination of the strike and the setting up of alternative dis-
pute settlement machinery, such as a tripartite board, to arbitrate the
issues in dispute.
Under Caricom countries' trade union statutes, picketing in the strict
sense of the term - i.e., watching and besetting - if legalised at all, is
legalised only to the extent that it is made lawful for those engaged in
it to do acts which would otherwise have constituted nuisances at common
law, provided they do no more than attend at or near a house or place
where a person resides or works or carries on business, etc., "for the
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of
peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working."
Certain acts, such as persistently following a person, hiding his tools, or
following him in a disorderly manner to compel him to take a course of
action that he has a right not to take, are made statutory offences pun-
ishable by fine or imprisonment.
Recently, the subject of picketing has been examined by the Royal
Commission on Trade Unions, 1968, in the United Kingdom, and the
Royal Commission Inquiry Into Labour Disputes, 1968, in Ontario, Can.
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ada. The Royal Commission in the U. K. concluded that the law of
picketing was satisfactory, and in 1971 the government also adopted that
view.62 The Royal Commission in Ontario, Canada, 63 however, has rec-
ommended greater control including:
1. The Appointment of A Picket Captain. He is to have au-
thority and the duty to make every reasonable effort to maintain
lawful conduct on the picketing line.
2. Pickets and Placards. Persons who are not members of
the unit of employees on strike or officials of the union are not to
act as pickets. Pickets may carry only appropriate placards with
legitimate information.
3. Mass Picketing. The number of pickets must not be greater
than what is reasonably adequate for the purpose.
4. Ally Picketing. Where an employer, in order to offset the
economic impact of a work stoppage, makes any form of arrangement
by which the work of the industry is in any substantial degree car-
ried on by another employer and the established relations of the
struck employer with his customers or correspondents are thus main-
tained, the strikers would be entitled to picket the work-place of such
co-operator. However, such picketing must not affect the employees
of the co-operator and their relations to him.
These recommendations are, with respect, sound ones in the context
of the law of picketing.
It may also be pointed out that, as the law stands, statutes do not
afford protection to an employee who respects a lawful picket line and
in so doing fails to perform his assigned work. It would seem to be clear
that if the right to strike and the right to picket in support of it is guar-
anteed, then, without fear of penalty, such as discharge or other disci-
plinary action, an employee should be entitled to refuse to cross a picket
line to perform the work of another employee who is engaged in a strike.
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